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THEURILLAT T. and CREVOISIER O. Sustainability and the anchoring of capital: negotiations surrounding two major urban
projects in Switzerland, Regional Studies. This article deals with the anchoring of mobile ﬁnancial capital in the city and urban sus-
tainability. Illustrated by a case study in the Swiss context, it develops the theory that new forms of negotiation are appearing
around urban projects. Development/construction ﬁrms are playing a central role: they are capable of evaluating and translating
the multiple dimensions of a project and certain sustainability challenges into ﬁnancial terms, in a way that permits the anchoring of
capital in the city. In parallel, the issue of sustainability depends greatly on the capacity of the local actors to negotiate with the
promoters of urban projects.
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THEURILLAT T. and CREVOISIER O.可持续性与资本锚定：瑞士两大主要城市计画的协商，区域研究。本文处理流通的
金融资本在城市中锚定与城市的可持续性。本研究透过瑞士脉络中的一个案例研究说明，发展出以下理论：有关城市
计画的崭新协商形式正在浮现。发展／建设公司扮演了核心角色：它们有能力评估计画的多重面向与特定的可持续性
挑战，并将之转译成金融专业用语，使得资本得以锚定于城市之中。同时，可持续性议题则大幅倚赖地方行动者与城
市计画提倡者进行协商的能力。
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THEURILLAT T. et CREVOISIER O. Durabilité et ancrage du capital ﬁnancier: négociations autour de deux grands projets urbains
en Suisse,Regional Studies. Cet article aborde la question de l’ancrage du capital ﬁnancier mobile dans la ville et la durabilité urbaine.
Illustrée par une étude de cas en Suisse, il développe la thèse de l’apparition de nouvelles formes de négociations dans le cadre de
projets urbains. Les entreprises de développement/construction jouent un rôle central: elles sont capables d’évaluer et de traduire
les multiples dimensions d’un projet et certains enjeux de durabilité en termes ﬁnanciers de manière à ce que l’ancrage du capital
dans la ville puisse se réaliser. Parallèlement, la question de la durabilité dépend beaucoup de la capacité des acteurs locaux à
négocier avec les promoteurs des projets urbains.
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THEURILLAT T. und CREVOISIER O. Nachhaltigkeit und die Verankerung von Kapital: Verhandlungen im Zusammenhang mit
zwei großen urbanen Projekten in der Schweiz, Regional Studies. Themen dieses Beitrags sind die Verankerung von mobilem
Finanzkapital in der Stadt sowie die urbane Nachhaltigkeit. Anhand einer Fallstudie aus der Schweiz wird die Theorie
aufgestellt, dass im Umfeld von urbanen Projekten neue Formen der Verhandlung auftreten. Hierbei spielen Bauﬁrmen eine
zentrale Rolle: Sie sind in der Lage, die verschiedenartigen Dimensionen eines Projekts sowie bestimmte
Nachhaltigkeitsprobleme zu bewerten und in ﬁnanzielle Begriffe zu übersetzen, was eine Verankerung von Kapital in der Stadt
ermöglicht. Gleichzeitig hängt der Aspekt der Nachhaltigkeit in großem Umfang von der Fähigkeit der lokalen Akteure zur
Verhandlung mit den Finanzierern von urbanen Projekten ab.
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THEURILLAT T. y CREVOISIER O. Sostenibilidad y el fortalecimiento del capital: negociaciones en torno a dos importantes
proyectos urbanos en Suiza, Regional Studies. Este artículo trata sobre el fortalecimiento del capital ﬁnanciero móvil en la
ciudad y la sostenibilidad urbana. A partir de un estudio de caso en el contexto suizo, desarrollamos la teoría de que están
apareciendo nuevas formas de negociación en el marco de los proyectos urbanos. Las empresas de desarrollo/construcción
desempeñan un papel principal: son capaces de evaluar y traducir las múltiples dimensiones de un proyecto y los diferentes
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retos de sostenibilidad en términos ﬁnancieros, facilitando así el fortalecimiento del capital en la ciudad. A su vez, la cuestión de la
sostenibilidad depende en gran medida de la capacidad de los actores locales para negociar con los promotores de proyectos
urbanos.
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JEL classiﬁcations: G23, O16, O21, R3
INTRODUCTION
Since the built environment is today a category of ﬁnan-
cial assets among others (company securities, state bonds,
derivatives, etc.) that permit investors to diversify their
portfolios, the impact of ﬁnancialization on the urban
landscape has not been extensively studied within
urban geography (CLARK, 2006). This issue has received
even less attention from the sustainable development
angle. Despite some work in the US context (HAGER-
MAN et al., 2006, 2007), it is not known how the cities
reconcile two seemingly contradictory components
within the transformation of their landscape.
Based on uniting two ﬁelds of literature on urban
geography, this article develops a territorial approach
(CREVOISIER, 2011) to urban governance and nego-
tiations, which are the basis of both the anchoring of
capital in the city and urban sustainability. The ﬁrst
ﬁeld is that of emerging literature on ‘actually existing
sustainabilities’ (KRUEGER and AEGYMAN, 2005). By
focusing on the institutional and political character of sus-
tainability, this approach seeks to examine it as it exists
within urban reality. At the heart of urban policies and
governance, sustainability is seen as an unavoidable chal-
lenge and the subject of negotiations and institutional
arrangements that reﬂect the tensions and conﬂicts of
interest between the various actors involved. The
second ﬁeld of literature refers to what is termed here
the ﬁnancialization of the city. Deﬁned as the construc-
tion of the mobility/liquidity of capital (CORPATAUX
and CREVOISIER, 2005), ﬁnancialization applies the
logic of ﬁnancial investors to urban production and
creates a new role for the developers/builders of urban
projects. Since these latter possess the knowledge and
information that are essential for investment, they are at
the centre of evaluating urban projects and translating
them into ﬁnancial terms.
By putting into perspective sustainability and ﬁnan-
cialization as they exist in the urban environment, the
theory is developed that new forms of negotiation are
appearing, and are driven by some coalition of pro-
motion of the urban project that vary depending on
the urban context. Directly involved in the negotiations
with ﬁnanciers and local urban actors, the development/
construction ﬁrms are playing a central role in this
anchoring coalition: they are capable of evaluating and
translating the multiple dimensions of a project and
certain sustainability challenges into ﬁnancial terms, in
a way that permits the anchoring of capital in the city.
In parallel, the problematization of sustainability
depends, to a large extent, on the capacity of the local
actors – both private and public – to become mobilized
and to negotiate with the promoters of urban projects.
This theory is illustrated by comparing two major,
emblematic real estate projects in Switzerland that
were purchased by ﬁnancial institutions.
The article is divided in two sections. The ﬁrst pre-
sents the two ﬁelds of literature from which an approach
is developed that permits one to consider the relations
between ‘ﬁnance, city and sustainability’ as negotiated
translations. The second section describes the forms
taken by these negotiated translations in the case of
two urban projects.
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE
FINANCIALIZED CITY
This section develops a territorial approach (CREVOI-
SIER, 2011) to the production of sustainability within
the ﬁnancialized city, based on two ﬁelds of literature
on urban geography. On the one hand, the work
centred around urban policies and governance stresses
the institutional and political character of sustainability
and consequently the diversity of forms that it can take,
depending on the urban context. On the other hand,
recent work centred on the ﬁnancial actors and their
investments in major urban projects in metropolises
demonstrates the functional and spatial changes
brought about by strengthening the links between
ﬁnance and real estate markets. In this way, uniting
these two ﬁelds of literature makes it possible to demon-
strate the new role played by the promoters of urban pro-
jects and to deﬁne them as anchoring actors and, in
parallel, to address both the anchoring of capital in the
city and urban sustainability as a subject of negotiation.
Urban durability as an institutional and political challenge
Falling within the ﬁeld of urban political geography, the
emerging literature on ‘actually existing sustainabilities’
(EVANS and JONES, 2008; KRUEGER and GIBBS,
2008; KRUEGER and AEGYMAN, 2005) is based on
the principle that sustainability is at present a part of
urban policies and governance. This approach contra-
dicts, in particular, literature based on the theory by
HARVEY (1989) that stresses the move from managerial
urban government to entrepreneurial urban
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governance. For Harvey, the new forms of urban policy
are characterized by the priority given to economic
growth within the framework of strengthening interur-
ban competition following the increased mobility of
capital.1 Since cities play a strategic role in the accumu-
lation of capital, they thus appear as privileged labora-
tories for analysing the diversity of forms of ‘actually
existing neoliberalism’ (BRENNER and THEODORE,
2002) which has developed gradually since the 1980s
and has spread to all European countries and also to
other continents (PECK and TICKELL, 2002; PECK
et al., 2009).
Considering that the ‘neoliberal approach’ has a too
structuralist perspective of analysing urban policy pre-
venting from paying attention of the institutional
change/evolution, an opposing theory, that of ‘actually
existing sustainabilities’ examines empirically the way in
which sustainability occurs in the cities and forms part of
the governance and institutional arrangements in differ-
ent social, political and economic contexts (KRUEGER
and GIBBS, 2008). No cities, in fact, and even those
that are emblematic neoliberal cities in Europe such as
Manchester and Leeds have growth and economic com-
petitiveness as their sole priority: they must also respond
to social and environmental demands (WHILE et al.,
2004). According to JONAS and WHILE (2007), it is a
question of analysing the ‘new spaces within urban gov-
ernance’, the institutional tensions and compromises
between economic competitiveness, protection of the
environment, and social justice. Today, some actors
such as the environmental non-governmental organiz-
ations (NGOs) and other institutions from civil society
can be active stakeholders in the governance of cities
and in the thematization of the environment or sustain-
able development (GERBER et al., 2011; BULKELEY,
2005).
For WHILE et al. (2004), sustainable development
represents an opportunity for the urban elites, and
leads to the emergence of a new form of urban regu-
lation that they term a ‘sustainability ﬁx’. This
concept, based on HARVEY (1982), is derived from
the fact that the geographical reproduction of the capi-
talist mode of production:
depends on uniting territorially-based class interests and
factions behind a coherent line of action (or state strategy)
in the form of a spatial ﬁx, which is capable of holding for a
time, though not necessarily resolving, tensions between
capital and labour, and economic development and collec-
tive consumption.
(Harvey, cited in WHILE et al., 2004, p. 551)
For others, even if sustainable development is more than
a simple ‘greening’, its inﬂuence on urban policies and
governance varies, and gives rise to different interpret-
ations. KRUEGER and GIBBS (2007, 2008) call ‘smart
growth’ the institutional compromises surrounding the
sustainable city in the United States. It is seen as a com-
promise between those seeking a new paradigm for
more compact urban development and those who
prefer a market for the built environment without gov-
ernmental intervention. Based on the UK context,
RACO (2005) supports the theory that the debates and
practices relating to contemporary urban development
are hybrid. They can refer to both the implementation
of neoliberalism and of sustainable development.
Ultimately, this approach lays the foundations for a
new way of understanding the question of sustainability
in various territorial contexts within urban political
geography. A priori not yet deﬁned, urban sustainability
takes on various forms that are not exempt from contra-
dictions between sustainable development and neoliber-
alism, since it is the result of negotiations and
arrangements among the various actors involved in
urban policies and governance. In this territorial
approach, these negotiations and arrangements take
place both in and on institutions which are both
causes and results of interactions between actors
(HODGSON, 1998). On one side, institutions are
framing the coordination between actors and are tools
for their rationales. In the other side, institutions are
also malleable as interactions are negotiation situations
where particular human wills are confronting and rules
adjusted to situations. In this way:
The actors are no longer autonomous, sufﬁcient, equipped
with a rationality that is independent of the context, but
are institutionalized actors. They are traversed by logics
that shape them and go beyond them, but on which
they act in return.
(CREVOISIER, 2011, p. 6)
In this approach, ‘institutions’, or more precisely the
backcloth of institutions in which players act and move
and the concept of ‘territory’, are very similar frames of
understanding. ‘Territory’ is the set of rules and relations
that tight human players together and human players
with objects. Property rights are a good example of
that. Just like institutions, territory is both the result of
past human interactions and the matrices out of which
human beings elaborate their projects for the future
and give sense to their present behaviours.
Furthermore, territory adds the time and space
dimension that was neglected by institutionalist econ-
omists. It allows understanding the various forms that
the institutional backcloth takes following the historical
period and the concrete, speciﬁc place. In a territorial
perspective, geographical and institutional scales can be
understood as the contexts in which players interact,
from the local to the global, depending on the insti-
tutions they share (same language, same laws, same
market, etc.).
The ﬁnancialization of the city
Although HARVEY (1982, 1985) was one of the ﬁrst to
highlight the central role of the banking system in the
creation of mobility and the urbanization of capital,
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the concept of ﬁnancialization is relatively recent in lit-
erature on real estate or the city. The origin of the links
between real estate markets and ﬁnancial markets began
with the creation of secondary markets in the United
States (WEBER, 2002). First, during the 1960s came,
on the one hand, the securitization of mortgage loans
granted to the middle classes and the creation of semi-
public institutions (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). On
the other hand came the securitization of real estate
and the emergence of a new type of ﬁnancial institution:
real estate investment trusts (REITs). Second, during the
1980s, REITs in the United States inspired their cre-
ation and development in various European countries,
in Australia and in Japan (AVELINE-DUBACH, 2008),
bringing with it the modernization of real estate funds
and the creation of new ones (LE FUR, 2006;
MARTY, 2005). The demand for investment in ‘bricks
and mortar’, notably for company buildings (ofﬁces or
commercial premises) on the part of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions thus grew.
The links between the built environment and ﬁnan-
cial markets strengthened further as a result of the stock
exchange crisis of 2000–2001 for company share
markets (THEURILLAT and CREVOISIER, 2012). In
parallel, but linked thereto, urban megaprojects
(FAINSTEIN, 2009) developed. Certain ﬁnancial invest-
ments were made in large complexes (airports, stadiums,
university buildings, hospitals, prisons, etc.) and in utili-
ties (telecommunications, power, transportation, etc.),
whose ﬁnancing and ownership were traditionally in
the hands of the public authorities. Other investments
concerned major private objects (large shopping
centres, business centres, etc.). With the growing invol-
vement of ﬁnancial actors in urban property, certain
authors suggest that ﬁnancialization shapes the urban
landscape, which is increasingly being evaluated accord-
ing to ﬁnancial criteria (CLARK et al., 2009; RENARD,
2008).
Financial intermediation and the evaluation of the city on the
ﬁnancial markets. The ﬁnancialization of the city sig-
niﬁes, according to the present authors and extending
in this way the work of CLARK and O’CONNOR
(1997), the development of a ﬁnancialized circuit/
logic that makes it possible to evaluate the city on the
ﬁnancial markets (Table 1). Indeed, ﬁnancial players
will set a monetary value on securities linked to such
or such building or set of buildings. This valuation
takes into account not only the quality of the building,
but also all the features that inﬂuence the expected gen-
erated income. Therefore, the qualities of the city (level
of income, quality of the urban governance, social stab-
ility, etc.), and of the nation (macroeconomic con-
ditions, strength of the currency, etc.) where the
object is located are also implicitly, but actually,
evaluated.
The ﬁnancialized circuit is based on a logic of invest-
ment portfolios typical of ﬁnancial operators and that
favours exit behaviour based on liquidity on the ﬁnan-
cial markets. Investors who decide to use this circuit/
logic have therefore the possibility to have real estate
assets in their portfolio while not buying and owning
physical buildings. Thus, this circuit transforms a real,
immobile asset such as a building or an infrastructure
into a ﬁnancial asset that is negotiable on the ﬁnancial
markets, whether they are organized or over-the-
counter markets.2 In that way, urban property then
becomes liquid and mobile in space (CORPATAUX and
CREVOISIER, 2005) and this circuit enables investors
to behave according to a logic of portfolio management
on the ﬁnancial markets. The built environment rep-
resents a category of assets that permits the diversiﬁca-
tion of investments. When deciding on the
composition of their portfolio, investors compare the
ﬁnancial risks and yields from one real estate investment
funds with one another, but above all with those of
other categories of ﬁnancial assets, by sector (company
stocks, derivatives, commodities, for example) and by
territory (European countries, emerging countries, etc.).
This logic of mobility/liquidity on the ﬁnancial
markets is opposed to the direct or traditional circuit/
logic. When they choose this circuit, investors possess
buildings or even infrastructures. Here, the risk and
return of a building are assessed on the real property
market. This means that the ﬁnancial features as well
as of other/extra-ﬁnancial ones – such as sustainability
for instance – are assessed individually and in the long-
term (ten to ﬁfteen years or even longer for infrastruc-
tures, for instance) depending closely on the location
of the real estate object and the property environment
market of the city/region. In this manner, the urban
income – that can of course be the object of speculative
Table 1. Two ideal types of circuits/logics: ﬁnancialized and direct
Types of market Terms of assessment/valuation Space/time features
Financialized
circuit
Financial
markets
Comparison of risks and returns of a share of a real
estate fund with other such shares and with
other ﬁnancial assets (stocks, states bonds,
commodities, etc.)
Features of assets that belong to the ﬁnancialized space
Instantaneous portfolio management based on a
liquidity/mobility logic
Direct circuit Real property
markets
Valuation of the risks and returns for each
building/infrastructures
Features of property given by the local real estate
market and the speciﬁcity of the location
Long-term valuation of the property objects
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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behaviours – is managed on concrete terms which are
closely related to territorial features and to the investors’
interests for buying/selling.
However, this distinction in two circuits/logics has to
be considered as ideal typical. In real-world situations,
those two circuits/logics may be much more inter-
twined. First, the same players, for instance pension
funds, insurance companies or real estate funds, may
use both circuits/logics at the same time. Second,
regarding yields evaluation and calculation, the question
is whether value is estimated on ﬁnancial market or on
local real estate markets. Now, there exist funds that
are not listed on stock market but which will use
various real estate ﬁnancial markets indices in order to
estimate their value. Other players, like banks, can also
do so, when they assess the liability of such a fund
before deciding on credits. Therefore, not being listed
does not mean that value is estimated on local real
estate markets. Financial market, with their own life,
which depends on the evolution of other sectors,
others spaces and on mimetic behaviours may greatly
inﬂuence this estimated value. Third, regarding risk cal-
culation and evaluation, being listed on a ﬁnancial
market normally means that you can exit easily. Now,
there exist of course speciﬁc agreements that can
prevent such or such investor to withdraw, rendering
the investment much less liquid. On the other hand,
in non-listed funds, agreements may favour some
players and guarantee them an easy exit, the other inves-
tors being committed to buy back shares at a price
deﬁned earlier.
More fundamentally, the distinction between those
circuits/logics allows at a micro-level to focus on the
shareholder perspective and on the macro-level to
understand the role of ﬁnancial market in the global
allocation of capital to real estate markets. Thus, by per-
mitting the ongoing evaluation of investments on
the ﬁnancial markets (ORLÉAN, 1999), the ﬁnancializa-
tion of the economy, in taking on new sectors and
territories – and consequently the city – can be inter-
preted as a process of constructing the liquidity/mobility
of capital (CORPATAUX et al., 2009). In this way the
investors/shareholders can use all the usual techniques
developed by ﬁnancial investors, the ﬁrst of them being
the portfolio theory. Therefore, prices of real estate are
largely inﬂuenced by indices of other ﬁnancialized
sectors and spaces as well as by the systemic ﬂuctuations
of ﬁnancial markets.
At a macro-level, the distinction between the two
circuits/logics also allows one to understand the allo-
cation of capital to the real estate sector. This phenom-
enon has two important dimensions. First, it means that
the global allocation of capital to the real estate sector is
far from being calibrated to the ‘real’, local, estimated
needs and means of local end users. This means that con-
siderable money may ﬂow from investors to local real
estate markets. Fund managers may either by existing
buildings or invest in projects elaborated by promoters
in order to answer to this demand – and not compulso-
rily to a demand expressed by users. Second, regarding
players, it means that players without any speciﬁc
knowledge on real estate market may invest very large
amounts of capital in this sector. They proceed with
the same usual logic of portfolio risk management, just
as they do in many other sectors, countries and vehicles
(THEURILLAT, 2011; THEURILLAT et al., 2010).
Specialized intermediation and the ﬁnancial evaluation of the
city on the real markets. Some major ﬁnancial investors
(either RE funds, REITs or pension funds) have the
competence to hold large real estate objects or infra-
structures (THEURILLAT et al., 2010; TORRANCE,
2009). The various professions that shall be called
those of specialized intermediation such as the promo-
ters, the building companies and the real estate compa-
nies (real estate services, brokers, agencies providing
comparable information about various real estate
markets) play a key role in the ﬁnancial calculations
and in obtaining capital on the part of ﬁnancial investors
(purchase of existing objects or the development
thereof) since they have the necessary knowledge of
the local markets (GUY and HENNEBERRY, 2002;
TORRANCE, 2009). Consequently, and second, to
characterize one’s view of the ﬁnancialization of the
city, these professions had to adapt to the demands of
their ‘new’ ﬁnancial clientele.
In the case of developing large urban projects, this
adaptation supposes the acquisition of new competences
in terms of legal and ﬁnancial structuring. In a sliding
movement from real estate towards urban networking
structures with a view to diversifying risks, LORRAIN
(2002) observes that since the 1990s, groups have
emerged in several countries that are capable of design-
ing, building, marketing and managing larger, more
integrated objects. In Spain, for instance, where real
estate and construction have been one of the pillars of
the economy since the 2000s, large promotion/con-
struction groups have developed and have diversiﬁed
their activities and products (POLLARD, 2007). On the
infrastructures market, TORRANCE (2009) shows how
the chain of actors has become more complex, and
describes the essential role played by the various special-
ized professions. By creating consortiums, ﬁnancial
investors are using assistance provided by specialists in
technical aspects, legal issues, management and ﬁnance
in order to analyse the local investment environment.
Moreover, certain professions involving real estate
analysis and expertise also play an essential role in enhan-
cing the transparency of the market for the built
environment and the comparative ﬁnancial evaluation
of cities. In the case of the business real estate sector in
Paris, AUVRAY et al. (2008) show that information is pri-
marily provided by real estate services companies and
brokers which, in the course of their transactions, con-
tribute to the databases created by the various insti-
tutions specializing in the analysis of the real estate
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markets (real estate study institutes or marketing
agencies). The information thus produced (by object,
market segment, region and district) then undergoes a
series of phases that are ﬁnancial abstraction and trans-
lation operations regarding the object, intended for
the ﬁnancial investors, which ultimately leads to a
focus on the risk and yield criteria. The sophistication
of the models used may however give rise to drastic sim-
pliﬁcation in reality, with the decisions involving a con-
siderable degree of subjectivity (ROBERTS and
HENNEBERRY, 2007).
Financialized urban spaces
The implication of ﬁnancial investors like REITs, RE
funds or pension funds in the ﬁnancialized circuit trans-
forms the geography of the built environment. First, one
notes a hierarchization of the space, since the invest-
ments on the part of the ﬁnancial institutions are
closely correlated to the urban hierarchy. It is above
all the main metropolises, in fact, that are preferred
and within them, the investments target certain districts
(THEURILLAT et al., 2010; HALBERT, 2004). Second,
ﬁnancialization is an important factor within the spatial
expansion of the built environment markets
(HALBERT, 2010), since to an increasing extent they
function on a global scale and organize themselves glob-
ally (TORRANCE, 2009; AVELINE-DUBACH, 2008).
Besides the size effect that makes institutional investors
more focused on cities (NAPPI-CHOULET, 2006), this
spatial orientation of ﬁnancial capital can be explained
in several ways:
First, it can be explained by the role of specialized
intermediation and more particularly that of real estate
services companies. FUCHS and SCHARMANSKI (2009)
observe that some of them have become genuine trans-
national concerns capable of providing data on the
markets of the main metropolises in different countries.3
On the one hand, the local information collected is at
the basis of the investment models used by the ﬁnancial
investors, and makes it possible to rationalize their
decision thanks to enhanced comparability. On the
other hand, the databases created tend in return to
orient and structure investments in the direction of
certain objects and certain places. This leads to a ‘place
dependency’ effect, focusing on the main metropolises
and certain objects because of growing yields once the
local markets have become ‘transparent’, the creation
of partnerships, or the construction of dominant,
mimetic opinions within the community of investors
(HALBERT and ROUANET, 2013; HENNEBERRY and
MOUZAKIS, 2013).
Next, the metropolises – mainly the largest of them –
are also well known by real estate ﬁnancial investors
because they are also often major ﬁnancial centres
(LIZIERI, 2009). This proximity broadens, to an even
greater extent, the knowledge of the local real estate
markets and of the need for business premises by the
main potential occupants such as multinationals:
notably ﬁnancial companies or major retailing groups.
Finally, the urban attraction of ﬁnancial capital is also
closely linked with the transformation of the urban land-
scape, as seen virtually throughout the world in recent
years. In the Western countries metropolises, this often
takes place within the framework of urban regeneration
in which the municipal authorities play an active role.
Whereas inEngland, urban regeneration projects are con-
sidered to be relatively risky by institutional investors
(ADAIR et al., 2003), those implemented in France, and
particularly in the Paris region between 1997 and 2002,
were extremely lucrative for certain ﬁnancial institutions
(NAPPI-CHOULET, 2006). On the one hand, the state
played an essential facilitating role regarding the invest-
ments by planning the development of new districts and
by providing infrastructure equipment. On the other
hand, the investments mainly involved both high entre-
preneurial risks (since the premises were not fully
leased), and considerable leverage. In the US context,
WEBER (2010) demonstrates that the municipal auth-
orities of Chicago constituted one of the driving forces
behind ﬁnancialization and the transformation of the
urban landscape by means of a speciﬁc ﬁscal instrument
consisting of the securitization of land and real estate
income expectedwithin the frameworkof urbanprojects.
This type of product is among the alternative ﬁnancial
products that permit the diversiﬁcation of institutional
investors’ portfolios.
The ﬁnancialization of the city thus leads to a highly
selective, partial appropriation of the urban space, with
the central districts of the large metropolises as a priority:
this means that ‘de-contextualized’ comparability is
emerging among cities, based on yield and risk criteria
alone. This draining of capital into the metropolises
changes the modalities of urban production, and leads
to questions regarding the way in which ﬁnancial
capital – today more mobile as a result of ﬁnancialization
– is invested in the city in concrete terms, and also the
type of territorial challenges related to urban develop-
ment and urban sustainability (Fig. 1). In this frame-
work, the role of the specialized intermediaries is
fundamental, since they perform two functions. The
ﬁrst one is their action on local real estate markets,
where they can act as promoters, brokers, advisers, etc.
The second function consists in providing information
and services to global investors and to ﬁnancial players.
They turn local real estate property rights into ﬁnancial
products (investment funds, for instance). They trans-
form the multiple, concrete characteristics of the build-
ings and of local markets into centralized, standardized
ﬁnancial information that allows comparison and prior-
itization by global investors. This ‘overarching’ geogra-
phy also gives rise to questions regarding the role and the
power of the local urban actors such as the municipal
authorities, the political parties, the environmental
associations or more broadly the inhabitants, who inter-
vene within the governance of urban projects.
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Responding symmetrically to the mobility of capital,
anchoring is deﬁned as a negotiation process related to
both the ﬁnancial capital and the sustainability of the
urban projects. In general, these relations between
ﬁnancialization and sustainability take on different
forms depending on the urban context concerned.
These forms are institutional arrangements negotiated
by the actors involved and that lead to (or not) concrete
objects being created (this is the issue that is of focus
here, and not on the purchase of existing buildings by
ﬁnancial institutions).
The anchoring actors are urban coalitionswith a direct
interest in seeing the (new) project becoming a reality at
that place. There are various types of them (private and/
or public actors, promoters, future users, etc.), depending
on the project and the urban context. Among the pro-
fessionals in the construction sector, it is considered that
development/construction companies play a central
role because they are involved in coordination with the
landowners and the various specialized professions
within the built environment sector (architects/engin-
eers for the design, real estate services companies and
brokers, etc.). In order for the project to take on concrete
form, the private economic actors must also obtain
support from, or negotiate with, the other local urban
actors, both public (municipal authorities4; political
parties) and private (NGOs, inhabitants).
The negotiations will consist in making two types of
calculations. On the one hand, ﬁnancial investors will
evaluate the expected proﬁt and risk on the base of
the technical, economic and legal aspects (type of
rents, quality of the construction, access infrastructures,
ownership and ﬁnancing, commercial activities, contri-
butions of public authorities, etc.). In this evaluation,
features linked to sustainable development will be
included either as costs (for instance, better insulation)
or as proﬁts (for example, energy sparing) or as risk
diminishing (for example, a lower exposition to future
energy problems). On the other hand, local players
like public authorities, inhabitants, NGOs, political
parties, etc. will also make many, usually less quantiﬁed,
calculations. They will evaluate the use value of the new
buildings. Issues related to sustainability will be part of
those calculations, either as monetary costs (if contri-
butions are required) or as better-use value. Nego-
tiations will therefore consist in ﬁnding an allocation
of costs, proﬁt and use values acceptable for both sides.
FINANCIAL NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING
SUSTAINABILITY IN SWITZERLAND
This section begins by addressing the way in which the
sustainability of two real estate projects, located in two
Fig. 1. The anchoring process of capital and of negotiation of sustainability
Source: Authors’ own elaboration
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different urban contexts in Switzerland, was negotiated
and translated into ﬁnancial terms, and ultimately led to
institutional arrangements for them to be ﬁnanced and
owned by ﬁnancial institutions. These arrangements
fall within the framework of urban governance in
which the local level has all the prerogatives in terms
of construction and spatial planning (RÉRAT et al.,
2009). Moreover, legislation relating to environmental
protection and land development guarantees environ-
mental organizations and inhabitants the right to inter-
vene. The practice in Switzerland is to publish
planned building projects in order to grant the public
the right to oppose them.
The two chosen urban projects are emblematic
because they served as examples for other major projects
in Switzerland. Located in the ﬁnancial metropolis of
Zurich, the ‘Sihlcity’ project was the country’s ﬁrst
urban entertainment centre (UEC). It was acquired for
a cost estimated at CHF600 million by a pool compris-
ing ﬁnancial institutions managed by Crédit Suisse Asset
Management Real Estate (CSAM-RE) that function on
a mobility/liquidity logic and belong to the ﬁnancialized
circuit. The institutions are all among the main real
estate investment entities in Switzerland: four real
estate funds (two quoted on the stock exchange, two
that are not quoted thereon and intended speciﬁcally
for institutional investors and that can be considered as
‘real estate private equity funds’ for institutional inves-
tors), the Crédit Suisse investment foundation (not
quoted on the stock exchange and only intended for
pension funds), and the real estate company Swiss
Prime Site, quoted on the stock exchange.
The second project, La Maladière, is located in a
medium-sized conurbation (Neuchâtel, 80000 inhabi-
tants), and was considered to be the ﬁrst project on
the public–private partnership (PPP) model in the
country. It is both a shopping centre and a public facility
(a football stadium with sports halls, and ﬁre and emer-
gency services), and was purchased for the sum of
CHF180 million by two institutions not quoted on
the stock exchange and functioning rather on a direct
circuit logic: the country’s largest public pension fund
(Publica) and one of its largest investment foundations,
belonging to the Cantonal banks (Swisscanto), whose
shareholders are exclusively pension funds (which
belongs to the same group of ‘private equity funds’ for
institutional investor like the Crédit Suisse investment
foundation above).
Based on research carried out within the framework
of a national programme on the built environment and
sustainability in Switzerland (PNR 54), the results pre-
sented are based on in-depth interviews with all the
actors involved in the project (investors; tenants, devel-
opers/constructors; local municipal authorities and
urban services; architects; managers; environmental pro-
tection associations, etc.). In addition, a case study on La
Maladière was carried out in parallel by another research
team within the framework of the same research
programme (CSIKOS, 2009). From an epistemological
point of view, these case studies are an exploratory exer-
cise intended to understand how contradictory social
changes (ﬁnancialization and sustainable development)
can coexist or even articulate in a concrete, real situ-
ation. The case study is considered here as an ‘opportu-
nity to learn’ (STAKE, 2005) and not a tool for
generalization. What is important is not so much the
enquiry itself than the result of it, that is to say, what
has been learnt and what one would like to
communicate.
La Maladière: an opportunity to ﬁnance public needs
The way in which the negotiations regarding the ﬁnan-
cing and sustainability of the La Maladière project took
place was, from the outset, based on converging interests
whereby the aspect of interpersonal relations was extre-
mely important: between the three anchoring actors,
that is, the Neuchâtel municipal authorities and in par-
ticular the role played by the municipal councillor
driving the project, on the one hand, and the main com-
mercial operator (Coop, the country’s second largest
retail group) and one of the country’s major pro-
motion/construction groups (Hans Rutihauser Suter,
HRS), on the other hand.
Since the end of the 1990s, the municipal authorities
had needed to respond to a certain number of needs
regarding real estate. The town’s dilapidated football
stadium no longer met security standards, and consti-
tuted the main investment (CHF20–25 million) to be
decided upon. In parallel, Coop was looking for land
on which to build a large shopping centre in the
region with a view to revitalizing its services and in
response to its major competitor (Migros), which also
intended to modernize its existing complex on the out-
skirts of the town.
Following the ﬁrst contacts (early in 2002), the two
partners rapidly reached agreement regarding the
concept of a mixed construction including public facili-
ties – mainly a football stadium that complied with
international standards – plus a shopping centre with
an underground car park. The location for the
stadium was excellent: it was close to an exit from the
highway that go through the town below ground, and
close to the centre. In November 2002, the partners
concluded a written agreement that committed them
to creating the region’s largest urban complex rapidly
and in a ﬂexible way: a departure from the normal pro-
cedure of public markets and the lengthy establishment
of formal, precise speciﬁcations. Coop and its partner
HRS, with whom several other commercial projects
had been realized, had previously conﬁrmed their
respective interest and roles in a written agreement.
Coop reserved the right to act as the owner of the build-
ing (except for the stadium) or overall tenant of the
commercial section (shopping centre and car park),
and HRS would act as the initial investor and builder.
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The Neuchâtel municipal authorities, with the support
of a local ﬁrm of architects, would act as a future
tenant (sports halls, ﬁre and emergency services) and as
owner (of the football stadium). The agreement also
stated that the contracting parties wished to carry out
the project based on a Minergie5 concept and use the
existing heating system in the district.
Structuring the project and translating it into ﬁnan-
cial and sustainability terms was based on the allocation
of tasks, reﬂecting the various legal and functional
aspects of the complex. For this project, which required
the approval of the municipal parliament because it
called for a modiﬁcation of the district zoning plan
(non-commercial use) and the sale of public land, the
municipal authorities played a double role. On the
one hand, it lobbied political entities, local associations
and public opinion, and on the other hand, it was in
charge of the control and regulation (for the building
and the urban planning). The private partners, for
their part, handled the technical structuring of the
project, its commercial operation and its ﬁnancing.
First, and in order to guarantee the rapidity promised
to the private partners, an internal steering group was set
up within the municipal authorities. The group was at
the time led by the department of the municipal coun-
cillor who had initiated the project (public works
department) rather than the competent department
(urban planning), which had expressed the opinion at
the time that the procedural deadlines were unrealistic.
Strangely, the group in question did not include a repre-
sentative of the ﬁnance department. Subsequently, with
the objective of anticipating opposition, the project was
the subject of a large public communication initiative,
carried out in conjunction with the environmental
sector (ecologist party, local branch of the Transport
and Environment Association, one of the country’s
largest environmental associations) and with local retai-
lers (liberal/radical party, independent retailers)
(CSIKOS, 2009).
The project was thus presented as an opportunity not
to be missed. The town would be ‘given’ a stadium by
private investors, through the sale of land (at a price
negotiated at CHF36 million) and renting premises
that would make it possible to provide public services.
This aspect of being a facility of public interest was high-
lighted, since it was of beneﬁt to the population and to
young people. In parallel, environmental impact studies
demonstrated that the project complied with legal stan-
dards regarding the protection of the environment and
trafﬁc. The three promoters also stressed the fact that
the project also constituted the rehabilitation of urban
wasteland, and thus contributed towards the densiﬁca-
tion of the urban fabric, notably with the creation of a
shopping centre within the urban space. In parallel,
the promoters stated that the project included sustain-
ability measures such as the creation of a new bus
route from the town centre and a quite large car park
(paid parking) with 930 spaces.6 Moreover, the
economic impact study commissioned by the municipal
authorities and paid for by the two private partners
demonstrated that the public authorities would beneﬁt
from the creation of 400 jobs and an improvement to
regional centrality in the form of a new, attractive
urban centre. Market analysis showed, in fact, that the
effects would be positive and complementary for all
the commercial areas of the town and in particular for
the nearby town centre, which had been a cause for
concern.
Once the project was accepted by the legislature
(June 2003), the phase of publishing the plans for
public reactions, mainly in connection with the modiﬁ-
cation of the district zoning plan and, second, in order to
obtain the construction permit, took place extremely
rapidly (less than one year instead of the usual duration
of several years) and the four cases of opposition led to
agreements with the municipal authorities (CSIKOS,
2009). Among the said agreements was the ofﬁcial
agreement between the municipal authorities and the
Transport and Environment Association. The agree-
ment speciﬁed a certain number of elements that were
included in the project dossier, notably regarding the
use of public transport (creation of a bus line, whose
operation costs for the ﬁrst two years were eventually
borne by the private partners), the creation of a car
park (paid parking after the ﬁrst hour), and the reduction
of noise in the district. It also recommended a study
regarding the installation of solar panels on the complex.
The construction permit (February 2004) conﬁrmed
the elements in the environmental impact studies drawn
up for the district zoning plan. All the technical details
regarding the quality of the project were in line with
the usual legal standards. The permit also conﬁrmed
that solar panels would be erected on the roof of the
stadium, for which the cost was eventually borne by
the state (municipality and canton). The Minergie con-
struction, however, disappeared completely, permitting
the private actors to have a free hand in choosing the
heating/cooling system.
The two private partners were thus in a favourable
position to ensure the economic and ﬁnancial proﬁt-
ability of the project, on the one hand, and to take
on the management and technical control of the
project, on the other hand. By its alliance with the
municipal authorities, Coop found it easier to impose
the construction of a new, well-located regional shop-
ping centre. Since it considered the legal structure of
co-ownership complicated, Coop rapidly decided to
ﬁnd an investor/owner. Acting as the main commercial
renter (which means collecting leases for the investor/
owner once established and acting as the commercial
manager), it thus assured the economic proﬁtability
of the project while maintaining control over its com-
mercial partners (choice, price, duration of the lease),
the design and volumes of the retail outlets, and the
car park. Since sustainability was not at the economic
heart of the project, and the price of the land had
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been agreed upon with the municipal authorities,
Coop and HRS were free to approach commercial
operators and investors, and to deﬁne their respective
proﬁtability margins.
Two main lease were then signed, one of twenty
years with Coop (CHF10 million per year) and a
second one of thirty years with the municipal authorities
(CHF1.3 million per year). Contacts were rapidly estab-
lished with two investors on the basis of personal
acquaintance to ﬁnd the CHF180 million needed. A
co-ownership company was established (Publicanto).
The two investors became equal co-owners (February
2007).
For these institutional investors, this project was a ﬁrst
within their real estate portfolio. None of them is listed
quoted on the stock exchange. The strategy of the ﬁrst
one, the Swiss Confederation Pension Fund (Publica),
was to increase its real estate direct investments. The
second one, the Swisscanto Foundation, is in charge of
real estate investments for its shareholders (which are
pension funds). Their intervention took place once
the ﬁnancial parameters of the projects had been
settled by all the other players. Thus, by remaining at
a distance and by not being involved directly in the
negotiations surrounding the structuring of the
project, they were able to purchase a turnkey project,
including public and private tenants who could be
counted on for the long-term.
Sihlcity: sustainability as a ﬁnancial risk
The Sihlcity project began based on conﬂicts between
the Zurich municipal authorities and the local concern
Karl Steiner (KS), which is one of the largest develop-
ment/construction groups in Switzerland. This situation
at the outset to a large extent structured the relations
between the anchoring actor (KS) and the authorities
during the development of this private project.
Following the failure of a ﬁrst project for an ofﬁce
space complex, designed during the 1980s and for
which a construction permit had been issued after
ﬁfteen years of obstacles, negotiations were held
between the two parties in the spring of 1999. On the
one hand, KS wished to avoid losing any more time
over a large plot of land (41991 m2) for which it had
an exclusivity contract with the owner. This land had
a number of advantages: an excellent location close to
the highway and near to the city centre of a conurbation
with over 1 million inhabitants, and was moreover well
linked to the public transport network (train, bus and
tram), and required no changes to the zoning plan.
On the other hand, the municipal authorities had
adopted a ‘collaborative planning’ approach with
private partners (RÉRAT et al., 2009).
During the said negotiations, the authorities held the
upper hand in order to establish the conditions regarding
the structuring of the project. First, the rehabilitation of
this urban wasteland was to be based on a mixed-use
concept. Moreover, the project should also be based
on a new mobility model that consisted of reducing
motorized trafﬁc by half, which meant resizing the car
park. These two demands were in line with the new
urban densiﬁcation and development strategy based on
coherency between urban development and mobility
policies, made possible thanks to massive investments
in public transport – either completed or planned – in
the Zurich conurbation.
A multipurpose urban entertainment concept, also
including ofﬁce space and a surface-level car park was
rapidly drawn up, and KS was able to reach compro-
mises with the city authorities. As the sole promoter,
it handled the technical and political negotiations with
a view to obtaining the construction permit and in par-
allel, the economic and ﬁnancial negotiations with a
view to ﬁnding operators and investor/owners. Its
purpose was to avoid the model trafﬁc reduction
concept placing the economic viability of the project
at risk, or rendering the costs of it higher.
During the negotiations with the authorities, the
promoter was a prisoner to the excellent connection
of the land to the public transport networks, since the
ﬁrst market study demonstrated a considerable potential
for clients (more than 20000 visitor per day), of whom
over 60% could use ‘soft’ means of transport (public
transport or on foot/by bicycle). Since the new trafﬁc
concept was economically sound, the promoter then
sought to negotiate the acceleration of the planned
work of linking the complex to the various forms of
public transport. Since the authorities refused to accept
the proposed deadlines, KS eventually bore the costs
of operating a bus line for the ﬁrst two years in order
for the construction permit to be issued as rapidly as
possible. Despite the said permit being granted, KS
was nevertheless forced to negotiate with the local
branch of the Transport and Environment Association,
which exercised its right of appeal. A game for three
actors developed during 2002, with the city authorities
intervening as a mediator with the association and the
promoter, while the latter had established preliminary
agreements with the main tenants and investors. In
compliance with the association’s demands, the
methods for calculating the number of parking spaces,
the limits to trafﬁc ﬂows and the ﬁnancial sanctions to
be applied if they were exceeded were speciﬁed in a
written agreement, and later in a second construction
permit, issued shortly afterwards.
It was necessary for KS to demonstrate, to the poten-
tial operators and investors, that the form to be taken for
the project’s sustainability – linked to a reduction in
individual trafﬁc – did not penalize the catchment area
for Sihlcity. The other argument, speciﬁcally intended
for the investors, was the innovative aspect of the ‘city
in the city’ concept, with a blend of commercial and
leisure areas of such a size and intended to respond to
a demand by its clientele. Following several market
studies that conﬁrmed the economic potential of
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Switzerland’s ﬁrst urban entertainment centre, Crédit
Suisse (CS) purchased the project in June 2003, when
only half of the surfaces had been leased, by four
major operators (Coop and Ochsner, its specialized
sports equipment chain; and the Sheraton Hotels and
Arena cinema chains).
Although KS had launched a call for offers abroad,
believing that the project was too large for most Swiss
investors, Crédit Suisse very rapidly expressed interest
in the project, for many reasons. First, its various real
estate investment funds – among the largest in the
country – had liquid assets to invest. In addition, the
concept of an urban entertainment centre was con-
sidered proﬁtable and would make it possible to diver-
sify the various means of investment. For Sihlcity,
Crédit Suisse set up an original operation by constituting
a company (Sihlcity SA), held by its six ﬁnancial insti-
tutions and managed by its afﬁliate company
(Wincasa), which had become specialized in the man-
agement of shopping and leisure centres for institutional
investors. This ﬁrst case of pooling thus made it possible
to absorb the CHF600 million paid for the project and
to dilute the risk. Finally, and in parallel to this ﬁnancial
operation, Crédit Suisse – based in Zurich and with
ofﬁces facing Sihlcity – needed new premises. Knowl-
edge of the district and the economic potential of Sihl-
city played a crucial role for accepting the risks of the
trafﬁc model and the agreement with the Transport
and Environment Association.
As soon as it had purchased the project, for which it
believed higher proﬁtability could be obtained by
ﬁnding operators for the remaining commercial surfaces
and ultimately achieving full occupation of the space
and leases, representing CHF46 million per year as of
the opening of the complex (March 2007), Crédit
Suisse again took over the role of promoter, and not
only that of ﬁnancial intermediary. In parallel, it
sought to optimize the economic proﬁtability of Sihlcity
in three ways. First, the connection to the public trans-
port network was improved by ﬁnancing the extension
of a tram route and other ‘soft mobility’ measures (pro-
viding bicycles, home delivery service, etc.). Second, a
new plan for surface allocation was rapidly drawn up
in order to increase the overall surface area. Third,
through calling upon a specialized company, the con-
struction work was supervised with the intention of
minimizing costs and guaranteeing the proﬁtability of
the investment.
Comparison of the cases
What has been learnt from these case studies regarding
the way in which capital is currently becoming
anchored in cities, in contexts characterized by sustain-
ability concerns (Table 2)?
The ﬁrst case – that of La Maladière in Neuchâtel, a
medium-sized town with no international ﬁnancial
activity – is interesting because it shows that towns
Table 2. Sustainability and the actors of the two urban projects
Initial situation
Economic proﬁle of the city Medium-sized, non-ﬁnancial town Financial metropolis
Urban project Converging of interests Diverging interests
Public–private interests Liberal state as a partner (public–private
partnership (PPP))
State external
Relations between ﬁnancialization
and sustainability
Status of sustainability Non-structuring sustainability: political
communication exercise
Structuring sustainability: challenge relating to private
vehicle trafﬁc
Relation between economic
and ﬁnancial proﬁtability and
sustainability
Does not strike at the economic heart of the
project, and the choice is left to the private actors
Concerns urban income and imposed by the local actors
Type of use Private: shopping centre and public: football
stadium, sports halls and ﬁre/emergency services
Private: shopping and leisure centre
Governance of the project
Financial actors Known at the outset (Coop), but change during the
course of the project
Final investors belonging to the direct circuit:
Confederation’s pension fund and Swisscanto
investment foundation
Not known at the outset
Ownership by Crédit Suisse funds and afﬁliation to the
ﬁnancialized circuit: ﬁnal investors (particular or
institutional) that can vary on the ﬁnancial markets
Anchoring actors Trio: public authorities and tenant (Municipality of
Neuchâtel), private operator (Coop) and
construction company (HRS)
Single: initial risk by promoter/builder (Karl Steiner),
then investor played an entrepreneurial role (Crédit
Suisse)
Political urban actors Role very much as a partnership, interpersonal
relations
Administrative authorities bypassed
From a distance, no direct intervention
Proactive administrative authorities
Urban actors (civil society) Low level of intervention High level of intervention
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
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of this size can today obtain investments from insti-
tutional investors, who over the last twenty years had
systematically preferred the ﬁnancial markets. In Neu-
châtel, within a coalition of three anchoring actors, a
public one and two private, it must be stressed that sus-
tainability was particularly addressed during the launch
phase of the project, as a mandatory theme within pol-
itical communication. The municipal authorities, with
the speciﬁc role played by the (right-wing) municipal
councillor driving the project, were included in the
coalition of anchoring actors that was created, together
with the two private partners. The PPP project was
presented as an opportunity to be seized and handled
rapidly. This meant, notably and from the outset, the
absence of alternative projects, circumventing the
public markets, and bypassing the expertise of two
key municipal departments (urban planning and
ﬁnance). After the approval by the legislature, the
central commitment regarding sustainability that had
been announced (Minergie construction) was left
aside. This project was of great importance for the
town since it resolved the issue of real estate need. It
was built in accordance with the modalities of private
ﬁnancing, yet with numerous ﬁnancial guarantees on
the part of the municipal authorities, notably long-
term leases. Subsequently, initiatives such as covering
the roof with solar panels emerged, and the costs
were ultimately borne by the state. Debate regarding
sustainability was at no point at the heart of the
project, however, that is, a shopping centre that was
extremely easy to reach by car, and public guarantees
regarding leases.
From the two ideal types of investment circuits
point of view, this complex whose value is assessed
on the real property market only would belong to
the direct circuit. It is indeed directly held by
Publica, the country’s large public pension fund, and
by Swisscanto foundation, a structure created by the
cantonal banks (which are private entities but guaran-
teed by the cantons). These institutions invested their
funds in the project, mainly as a precaution against
the volatility of the ﬁnancial markets. It was above all
a case of investing in real estate (which at the beginning
of the 2000s was considered to be less volatile than
other ﬁnancial assets) and also one of having a direct
link to the ownership and management of the
complex (without needing to act via the markets).
These institutions had – and still have – the objective
of proﬁtability from their investment by operating
the complex on the long-term. Neuchâtel is not a
town known by ﬁnancial investors. Urban income is
above all obtained from commerce, which competes
within the catchment area. Despite the co-ownership
structure created, the possibility of obtaining added
value by reselling the complex is low. It is above the
long-term proﬁtability of the complex that is targeted,
and this was consolidated before selling the project to
the investors.
The second case – that of Sihlcity – beneﬁts from an
excellent location close to the centre of Zurich: the
largest city in the country and a world-scale ﬁnancial
centre. Here, however, the authorities adopted a com-
pletely different logic. They had from the outset an
existing policy characterized by left-wing/green
values: a vision of long-term development explicitly
based on sustainable development and beneﬁting from
their familiarity with managing major projects.
Regarding sustainability, the municipal authorities
and subsequently an environmental organization inter-
vened in turn in order to obtain improvements to a
second, private project developed by the sole anchoring
actor, the development/construction concern Karl
Steiner. During the process, the tension reached a
point where it was necessary to explore new options,
and in particular the possibility of having a large-scale
commercial centre accessible mainly by public transport.
Expert evaluation revealed that such a choice was viable,
so only a reduction to the parking surface area and the
issue of ﬁnancing the link to the public transport net-
works remained to be negotiated. Sustainability in this
case was a means for the municipal authorities and the
environmental organizations to turn the potential
urban income from this project into a complex that
designed according to their vision of sustainability.
The second case would belong to the ﬁnancialized
circuit based on a logic of mobility/liquidity and on a
valuation of buildings on the ﬁnancial markets. For
this investment, the bank Crédit Suisse, a worldwide
ﬁnancial actor, had ofﬁces facing the site. The district
is clearly seen as an investment area for international
investors, with excellent opportunities for ﬁnancial
added value regarding the value of the complex. In
order for this potential to be realized, however, it was
necessary for the complex to be integrated within the
real estate companies or investment funds quoted on
the ﬁnancial markets. This was the role of some of the
investment companies to which Crédit Suisse sold the
shares in the project. Ultimately, it was the cash funds
from the ﬁnal investors who purchased shares on the
markets that made it possible to ﬁnance the complex
while preserving the operational control over the site.
The negotiations in fact made it possible to allocate
part of the income to sustainability. It was the investors,
under the aegis of Crédit Suisse, who – by subscribing to
the project – made it possible to turn the municipal
authorities’ innovative mobility concept into reality,
thanks to massive investment in the public transport net-
works on the part of the state (city, canton and
confederation).
The anchoring of capital in the Sihlcity project made
it possible to reconcile an investment of mobile capital at
an international scale with a ﬁrm urban sustainability
policy. Thus, the pressure exerted over recent years by
international investors in the area of large urban
objects made it possible in this case to turn ambitious
sustainability objectives into reality. This is something
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of a paradox, however, since one could think that
increasingly mobile capital, which leads cities to
compete with one another, would tend to lower the
demands regarding sustainability. The completely
unique conditions here, however, should not be forgot-
ten. The presence of the Crédit Suisse, an actor both
global and extremely local, was decisive. It played the
role of entrepreneur by purchasing the project before
it was ﬁnished, and also that of operator and of reseller
to the various real estate companies afﬁliated to it.
Would Crédit Suisse provide such ﬁrm support for a
project in a city that was not as sought after by inter-
national investors, even if the long-term operation of
the complex guaranteed good proﬁtability? This ques-
tion remains open.
CONCLUSION
The objective of this article is to demonstrate how two
apparently contradictory phenomena – ﬁnancialization
and sustainability – which characterize the production
of today’s cities can be linked in a concrete way. The
two projects analysed are emblematic of the major
urban objects that have emerged in Switzerland in
recent years, and that have been purchased by ﬁnancial
investors seeking alternative investments that permit
them to diversify their portfolio.
On a theoretical level, by putting together different
and separated ﬁelds of literature, this article develops a
territorial analytical framework based on the two con-
cepts of mobility and anchoring, related both to ﬁnan-
cial capital and to sustainability. On the one hand,
ﬁnancial investors can play on and with the various
scales within a ‘ﬁnancialized space’, by comparing the
risks and yields of the real estate of a city (London)
with economic activities of a region or a country (by
investing in Swatchgroup, for instance). On the other
hand, the urban organization takes place at the local
scale with urban actors more or less linked to territory.
In this way, anchoring is seen as a social and institutional
process that gives rise to new forms of negotiations and a
new role for the promoters of projects, that of anchoring
actors. Within their concrete investments, which mainly
take place in central areas of large cities, the ﬁnancial
actors call upon construction professionals, with the
central role played by the major projects industry (devel-
opment/construction companies). These latter do not
act in a social ‘void’ and must negotiate with the local
urban actors: primarily the public sector (municipal
authority, elected ofﬁcials, and with those from the
private sector and associations (NGOs, inhabitants).
The two case studies provide some responses regarding
the way in which the negotiations take place and the
ﬁnanciers’ position towards the actors involved in the pro-
jects and towards sustainability stakes. This anchoring
process develops in two separated, yet interdependent,
phases. During the development phase, negotiations
surrounding sustainability are to a large extent dependent
on the urban actors and their capacity to become mobi-
lized. Local players can express expectations in terms of
sustainability, they canmake concrete and realist proposals,
and they can exert some political pressures on construc-
ters/promoters. Financial players are not involved in this
ﬁrst phase of negotiation. They are of course implicitly
present in the sense that the action of promoters/construc-
ters aims at selling the project to them. In order to do that,
they need to reach a credible minimum return rate on
investment, imposed by ﬁnancial markets. It has to be
reached by the project before any formal investment
decision. During this ﬁrst phase, the negotiations
concern the various qualitative dimensions of the
project, including sustainable stakes. The promoters/
developers who own the project up to that point translate
those qualitative features intoﬁnancial datawhichdemon-
strate certain rates of return and risk. Then, there is a
second a separate step in the anchoring process which is
dedicated to the anchoring of capital. These negotiations
occur in a bilateral way between the owner(s) of the
project and the ﬁnancial player(s) who intend to buy it.
The interesting point regarding this sequential process is
that ﬁnancial players do as if they would be in any way
neither responsible for sustainability nor concerned by
the fact that they have amore or less sustainable infrastruc-
ture in their portfolio.
Today, the way in which the cities negotiate both the
anchoring of ﬁnancial capital and sustainability rep-
resents a very concrete challenge regarding its analysis
in terms of urban geography. Three main issues seem
particularly relevant for further research. It would be
of interest, ﬁrst, to examine, in other cities and with
regard to their size but also their economic specialization
(ﬁnancial centres or not), whether the local actors –
notably those from the public sector – are in a position
to negotiate the urban income with the ﬁnanciers,
taking the cultural and institutional contexts into
account. What can be put forward here is a proactive
role of government, not only in terms of subsidies or
other ﬁnancial aids, but also in institutional and political
terms. Local governments have often many ways of
action or tools for negotiation particularly because
they deliver the construction permit. In that way,
various urban needs (such as transportation connexion,
public space, etc.) or clear sustainability stakes can be
conditions to promoters/investors.
Second, although an entire ﬁeld of literature has ana-
lysed the role of actors specialized in urban production
and particularly that of developers (for example, GUY
and HENNEBERRY, 2002; LORRAIN, 2002), their role
has not been linked to the ﬁnancialization process of
the built environment, or with the question of urban
sustainability. In the present authors’ opinion, this
industry increasingly develops large-scale projects for
ﬁnancial actors and has consequently a new role
which consists of negotiating the anchoring of capital
in the city subject to the constraints of sustainability.
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Finally, it is still not know whether the choice by
urban players to promote sustainable infrastructures
will have positive effects on the returns of investors.
Today, in the Swiss case, it clearly appears that investors,
ﬁnancialized or not, do not ﬁght for more or less sustain-
ability, corresponding to those of the market, either
ﬁnancial or real property ones.
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NOTES
1. It is worth mentioning that Harvey Molotch (MOLOTCH,
1976) and with John Logan (LOGAN and MOLOTCH,
1987) were among the ﬁrst to show the role of growth
coalitions or growth machines in the development of the
city, and in particular through and around land and real
estate interests.
2. The over-the-counter market has developed considerably
over recent years. The real estate funds not quoted on the
stock exchanges (often with a small number of investors or
as private equity) today account for the majority of overall
investment in non-residential real estate. Most of these
funds are created and held by pension funds, other insti-
tutional investors or investment banks (NAPPI-
CHOULET, 2009). As a result, these kinds of funds are
much less liquid than quoted funds, preventing immediate
exit due to contractual agreement or high costs.
3. For example, Richard Ellis, Jones Lang LaSalle, or
Cushman and Wakeﬁeld.
4. With sometimes a multiscalar public governance in some
countries, comprising regional, national or even
European authorities, for instance.
5. Minergie is the Swiss certiﬁcation for High Environmental
Quality related to sustainable construction.
6. According to the agreement between the municipal auth-
orities and the Coop, the Coop beneﬁted from the transfer
of the 165 spaces planned for the needs of the district.
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